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Title: The Politics of Local Government Reform in Northern Ireland 
Abstract 
A major review of public administration in Northern Ireland has resulted in proposals for 
radical reforms in health, education, and local government services. Although originating 
from the devolved government of 1999, intermittent suspensions resulted in Direct Rule 
Ministers taking over responsibility for the review. This article traces the influence of a 
sizeable body of research evidence on the outcomes of the review, specifically 
controversial reforms to local government, and the significant influence attached to 
macro political factors in reaching key public policy decisions. It also highlights the 
asymmetry in power relations between Stormont and local government and how 
devolution has simply compounded regional centralism in Northern Ireland. 
 
Introduction 
Northern Ireland has witnessed its most significant political development for decades. 
After years of political stalemate, the Northern Ireland Assembly was restored on 8
th
 May 
2007 following almost five years in suspension (since October 2002). The (then) 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain, described the establishment of a 
power-sharing Executive and devolved Assembly as ‘the final resolution of what has 
been, for centuries, the most intractable source of political conflict in Europe’ (Hain, 
2007: 1). Witnessing the key protagonists, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and 
Sinn Féin, going into government together, argued Hain, ‘makes ‘historic’ seem like a 
cliché’. Even allowing for the media hyperbole associated with the occasion, Northern 
Ireland has entered a new era of political accommodation with huge expectations for 
‘normal’ as opposed to the zero-sum politics of the last 30-odd years. Not surprisingly a 
backlog of public policy issues awaited the new Executive, key amongst which were: a 
review of the selective system of secondary level education, the proposed introduction of 
water charges, and public sector reform. 
 
Since the prorogation of Stormont in 1972, acute political, constitutional and security 
issues have, for obvious reasons, consumed ministerial energies and the task of running 
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their departments has, by default, been left to senior civil servants. Under ‘direct rule’, 
British Ministers had no electoral base in Northern Ireland removing any explicit political 
accountability. These circumstances conferred a special status on officials who wielded 
virtually unfettered power and controlled significant public resources (Carmichael, 2002). 
Whilst ‘normal’ mechanisms of public accountability applied (the fairly remote prospect 
of appearing in front of Westminster’s Public Accounts Committee), Northern Ireland 
governance was accorded a much lower priority than macro political issues. Given the 
context of a unique set of political arrangements, by comparison with other parts of the 
United Kingdom, this paper attempts to do three things. First, it will consider the policy 
making process in Northern Ireland in the absence of direct ministerial involvement and 
the influences thereon. Second, using a case study of local government, it will consider 
whether Northern Ireland has embraced the move towards evidence based policy making 
heralded by the Labour Government in the rest of the United Kingdom. Third, it will 
consider the extent to which devolution in Northern Ireland impacts on regional 
centralism which has characterised central-local government relations since the early 
1970s. 
 
Policy Making in Northern Ireland 
But for the short interludes when Northern Ireland had devolved government, policy 
making has been in the hands of a small civil service élite since 1972. Civil servants, of 
course, contend that they did not seek such a monopoly on the decision making process 
but by force of circumstances, visiting ministers were so pre-occupied with more 
important security matters, public policy matters were left to them. As one observer of 
the direct rule period put it: 
 The concern now expressed more frequently than in the past is that the 
operational impact of the present political circumstances means that senior civil 
servants are placed in positions of greater influence, either by the effects of direct 
rule which reduce the involvement of ministers (who cannot be readily available) 
or the acceptance by senior officials of a higher profile in public (Simpson, 1997: 
4). 
 
Given the powerful role assumed by civil servants, it is no surprise that some found it 
difficult to adjust to the accountability demands placed on them by the return of devolved 
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government in December 1999 (albeit for intermittent periods thereafter). A leaked memo 
in 2001 from the (then) Permanent Secretary of Regional Development highlighted 
resistance to requests from the Assembly’s statutory Environment Committee for access 
to departmental working papers. The Permanent Secretary referred to practice elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom and ‘difficulties’ created by ‘the lack of the sort of conventions 
about the roles of Ministers, officials, the Assembly, Committees, etc which have evolved 
over centuries in Westminster’ (Northern Ireland Assembly, Research and Library 
Services, 2001:15). Members of the Legislative Assembly, in turn, perceived this as civil 
servants being unwilling to co-operate with elected representatives. Further criticism of 
civil servants came from Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader Mark 
Durkan who claimed that even during the stop-start spells of around 2½ years of 
devolved government since 1999
1
 the power sharing Executive ‘either tended to be more 
conservative by instinct or allowed themselves to be conditioned by the assumptions and 
attitudes of civil servants’ (Durkan, 2003: 1). This, he claimed, prevented a more radical 
government agenda. Civil servants on the other hand argued, in research commissioned to 
review their response to devolution, that the long standing culture and values of the civil 
service ‘remained appropriate’. By way of contrast, politicians and external organisations 
considered that ‘the need to develop the culture of the civil service was perhaps the 
biggest issue’ which they faced (OFMDFM, 2002:23). Specifically, some devolved 
government ministers referred to inflexibility of thinking and the need for the civil 
service to modernize its approach  
 
It is also clear that the Northern Ireland Civil Service has managed to evade or avoid 
public policy initiatives aimed at improving governance and policy making in other parts 
of the United Kingdom. Hence the Modernising Government agenda; Professional Policy 
Making for the 21
st
 Century; Adding it Up; and Better Policy Making, appear to have all 
but by-passed Northern Ireland (Cabinet Office, 1999a; Cabinet Office, 1999b; Cabinet 
Office 2000; and Cabinet Office, 2001, respectively). As a result, Rose’s depiction in 
                                                 
1
 Until the current power sharing Assembly took office on 8
th
 May 2007, there had been 4 periods of 
devolution in Northern Ireland since the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement: 2
nd
 December 1999 - 11
th
 
February 2000; 30
th
 May 2000 - 10
th
 August 2001; 12
th
 August 2001 - 21
st
 September 2001; and 23
rd
 
September 2001 - 14
th
 October 2002. 
 5 
1971 of Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’ has been reinforced further as a kind of public 
administration backwater of the United Kingdom impervious to attempts aimed at 
improving the quality of public service provision. Instead, the Northern Ireland Civil 
Service has pursued what it describes as ‘a reform agenda appropriate to the Northern 
Ireland context’ outlined in a policy document entitled Fit for Purpose (OFMDFM, 2004: 
8). Therein, its ‘unique’ reform agenda comprised 3 core elements: prioritising front line 
services; building capacity amongst its staff; and embracing diversity in its workforce. In 
practical terms, implementing the Fit for Purpose agenda is vested in the Department of 
Finance and Personnel which is co-ordinating a major reform programme under the 
banner Changing for the Better
2
.  
 
Northern Ireland departments have been offered guidance on public policy through a 
document entitled A Practical Guide to Policy Making in Northern Ireland which makes 
claims to the uniqueness of devolved government and the need for policy development to 
be ‘highly inclusive and transparent’ (OFMDFM, 2003: foreword). The guide argues that 
‘policy decisions should be based on sound evidence’ and lists internal departmental 
sources, government funded independent bodies, and non-government organisations as 
the ‘likely sources of information and expertise on evidence to support policy making’ 
(OFMDFM, 2003: 23). The policy making guide fails to acknowledge however what 
Williams (2002: 89) refers to as the wider political factors to which policy makers 
typically give weight, one of which is ‘controversiality – the extent of likely support or 
opposition among those most affected’.  Since the guide was written by civil servants 
primarily for a civil servant audience, straying into political territory may have been seen 
as outside their brief.  
 
Yet more recent research from the Government’s Social Research Unit conducted on 
policy making in Whitehall departments, the Scottish Executive and the Welsh 
Assembly, contrasts markedly with the Northern Ireland guidance by acknowledging: 
                                                 
2
 The key reforms include: the review of public administration; investment strategy for Northern Ireland; 
water, rating, health and education reforms; welfare modernisation; and civil service reform. 
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 The reality of policy making/delivery was described (by civil servants) as messy 
and unpredictable. Importantly, there was a clear understanding that evidence is 
just one factor to be taken into consideration alongside other factors such as the 
political imperative and response to media and world events (Campbell, Benita, 
Coates, Davies and Penn, 2007: 6).  
 
The Social Research Unit makes reference to non-research factors which also influence 
policy and includes the role played by Ministers in reaching policy decisions. Some 
ministers, they reported, routinely ask for evidence from their officials, others were less 
concerned with an evidence base, or as one of the interviewees in their research put it 
‘there is a political context to almost everything we do… There are often political 
commitments that lead you in directions that the evidence doesn’t necessarily strongly 
support’ (Campbell et al, 2007: 14).  
 
So strong is the political influence that Hope (2006) sees a basic ‘incompatibility between 
the ideology of evidence-based policy and the natural inclination of the political process 
to want to secure the best outcomes’ for itself (quoted in Grayson, 2006: 397). Burton has 
argued that the ‘utilisation of research-based knowledge is driven as much by political 
expediency and broader social and political factors as it is by standards of objective truth 
and epistemological certainty’ (Burton, 2006: 191). He suggests policy researchers need 
to become more politically savvy as well as technically skilled if they are to have 
influence. Similarly Parsons recognises ‘that ‘facts’ are embedded in the world of values 
and politics and competing frames’ whereas ‘evidence based policy making wishes to 
extricate them from the political/value quagmire’ (Parsons, 2002: 58). He endorses 
Schön’s idea that government should facilitate reflective organisations to self-transform, 
in contrast to the modernising agenda which is predicated on strategic steering where 
‘prediction and control is so difficult and ‘evidence’ is so problematic’ (Parsons, 2002: 
51). Beyond the influence of politics, Davies (2004), drawing on the work of Nutley, 
Walter and Davies (2003), highlights the experience, expertise and judgement of decision 
makers as important influences on policy making, particularly in situations where 
evidence is equivocal, imperfect or non-existent. Given the powerful role exerted by civil 
servants in Northern Ireland and the absence of a UK modernising agenda, was there an 
evidence based approach to public policy making? 
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The Review of Public Administration 
To try and understand the policy making process in Northern Ireland we examine in some 
detail how the (then) British Secretary of State, Peter Hain, and his ministers reached key 
decisions on a major public administration reform programme. In one of its earlier 
incarnations, the Northern Ireland Assembly decided that a pressing priority was to 
reform and modernise its public services. The Northern Ireland reform agenda has three 
main foci: investing in the infrastructure needed to deliver public services; improving 
public services; and a Review of Public Administration which looked at who provided 
services, the way they were provided, and how effectively they met the needs of the 
citizen (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002). At the outset, the (then) First Minister argued 
that the Review of Public Administration was one of the major tasks facing the Northern 
Ireland Executive and presented ‘an opportunity of a generation to put in place a modern, 
accountable, effective system of public administration that can deliver a high quality set 
of public services to our citizens’ (Trimble, 2002:371). Years of neglect and short term 
political ‘solutions’ had left the administrative landscape of public services in Northern 
Ireland complex and bureaucratically cumbersome. Northern Ireland was both over-
governed and over-administered, in part as a result of political intransigence and poor 
governance (Carmichael, 2002).  With 3 MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 MLAs and 582 councillors, 
all for a population of 1.7 million people, it is hardly surprising that outside observers 
were bewildered by the extent of political representation yet little or no political progress 
(until recently). Equally, 11 government departments, 18 executive agencies, 5 health and 
social services boards, 4 education and library boards, 18 health trusts, 26 local 
authorities and over 100 non-departmental public bodies could only prompt the Chair of 
the Public Accounts Committee in Westminster to complain that ‘we found again and 
again that the quality of governance in Northern Ireland has been below par compared to 
the rest of the United Kingdom’ (Leigh, 2006: 253). 
 
The Review of Public Administration was launched in June 2002 to consider ‘existing 
arrangements for accountability, administration and delivery of public services in 
Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options for reform consistent with the 
arrangements and principles of the Belfast Agreement’ (Review of Public 
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Administration, 2002).  Although initiated under devolved government arrangements, its 
stewardship by local ministers lasted just over 4 months before suspension of the 
Assembly in October 2002. Hence, almost the entire work of the Review was conducted 
through a multi-disciplinary team of officials in the Office of the Minister and Deputy 
First Minister, working with the advice of a group of independent experts and reporting 
to a direct rule British minister (Birrell, 2007).  Its original timescale to produce 
conclusive recommendations by the end of 2003 proved overly optimistic and ‘final’ 
decisions on the outcomes were not announced by the Secretary of State until March 
2006 (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2006). Along the way, the 
review team produced a comprehensive body of empirical/research work that included: 
attitudinal surveys; qualitative data capturing the views of users, public sector staff and 
key stakeholders; comparative information gathered through study visits; a mapping 
exercise to unravel the complexities of the public sector; and briefing papers on issues 
relevant to the Review. The outcomes of the Review of Administration (Better 
Government for Northern Ireland, 2006: 5) refer directly to the body of research outlined 
above ‘that helped to inform these decisions’. In addition, the review team carried out 
two major Northern Ireland-wide public consultation exercises. The first consultation 
paper was published in October 2003 and attracted 174 formal responses, and the second 
follow-up consultation in March 2005 resulted in 1,032 responses. In short, the body of 
research evidence which underpinned the Review was thorough and the level of 
stakeholder and vested interest high, perhaps not too surprising given that the Northern 
Ireland economy is dominated by the public sector (with some 32% of the NI workforce 
employed in the public sector compared to the UK average of 22%).  
 
The resulting public administration reforms package announced by the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland was wide-ranging. A new Education and Skills Authority to replace 
a number of education bodies with direct support functions (including the 5 education 
and library boards); a single Health and Social Services Authority to subsume the 4 
health and social services boards; 18 health trusts reduced to 5; some 81 quangos to be 
cut to 53; and proposals for the 26 local authorities to be reduced to 7 ‘super-councils’. In 
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sum, the reforms when fully implemented claim to cut the number of public bodies in 
half from 154 to 75, with a roll-out timetable to mid-2009.  
 
Evidence-based policy making? 
So were the final decisions of the Review of Public Administration influenced by the 
substantial body of evidence and research which ran in parallel with the decision making 
process, as the final government report claims? We consider the issue of local 
government reforms as an example to test this claim. Local government in Northern 
Ireland has since 1973 provided a limited range of public functions confined largely to 
recreation, leisure, street cleaning, refuse collection and certain regulatory services (e.g. 
building regulations and environmental health) (Birrell and Murie, 1980). Its current 
scale is illustrated by the fact that in 2005/06, the local government sector as a whole had 
a net expenditure of around £360m, out of a budget for devolved functions of £7.5 
billion, less than 5% (Department of Finance and Personnel, 2006). Councils had been 
stripped of powers for their part in what Whyte (1983: 30) described as a ‘consistent and 
irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against Catholics’ in electoral practices, 
public employment, policing, public housing and regional policy, respectively. One of the 
core principles of the Review of Public Administration, following years of delivering 
minor functions,  was to deliver ‘strong local government’ with ‘councils at the heart of 
the local community providing civic leadership, ensuring the provision of local services, 
locally delivered, and working with local interests to develop their areas’ (OFMDFM, 
2006: 5).  Decisions on local government reforms in the Review of Public Administration 
included the following: 
 
 Local councils will be reduced from 26 to 7. The boundaries of the new councils 
were decided through an Independent Boundary Commissioner and are largely 
based on groupings of existing councils. 
 The new councils will have an increased range of powers. 
 Councils will have legal powers to lead a community planning process, and there 
will be a statutory duty on other agencies to work with the councils. In addition, 
councils will also have the power of ‘well-being’. 
 The number of councillors will be reduced from 582 councillors to 420 (7 
councils by 60 councillors). 
 10 
 A system of statutory checks and balances will be developed to ensure there is fair 
and transparent decision-making within the new councils. 
 A new system of local government finance will be developed. 
 
The proposed timescale for implementation of the above reforms is that elections were to 
be held to new shadow councils in 2008 which would become fully operational in spring 
2009 (a timetable now abandoned). 
  
Did the evidence support these reforms? The most controversial decision reached by the 
Review was to reduce the number of councils from 26 to 7. We consider three key 
elements of data gathering most relevant to the determination of the final number of 
councils – survey evidence, public consultation and stakeholder views. Two additional 
and detailed research exercises were commissioned by the Review Team to: (a) produce 
various council groupings which would provide for an even tax base across Northern 
Ireland and (b)  GIS-generated administrative zones based on compactness, travel to 
work and population, not exceeding 300,000 (McCluskey et al, 2004; Lloyd, 2005). The 
former concluded that ‘splitting the province into a few large areas is unlikely to produce 
an even tax base under either the existing or proposed rating systems’ (McCluskey et al, 
2004: 26). The latter claimed that ‘no single set of zones is clearly ‘optimal’ and the most 
sensible approach is to detail several sets of zones which can be considered in light of 
other (additional) criteria’ (Lloyd, 2005: 12). 
 
During public consultation on the changes, three options were offered: 7, 11 or 15 
councils. The (then) Minister responsible, Lord Rooker, in announcing the Government’s 
‘final’ decisions on local government reform stated: 
 This morning the Secretary of State (Peter Hain) announced that all of the 
evidence – and I stress evidence – not opinion or speculation, pointed to seven 
councils as the optimum model for local government in Northern Ireland. This 
was a view shared by almost two-thirds of respondents to the consultation who 
expressed a preference (Rooker, 2005a). 
 
This statement provided the rationale for selecting the 7 council model. We consider the 
various sources of evidence in some detail. 
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Survey evidence 
To test public opinion on proposals to reform councils, the Government’s Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) conducted a probability survey between 
June and August 2005 of 1,148 people (from a representative sample of almost 2000 
people: 59% response rate). 
One of the questions posed in the survey was: 
 In terms of the Review’s proposal to reduce the number of councils to either 7, 
 11 or 15, do you have a preference? 
 
The survey findings are set out in table 1 and figure 1. 
Table 1: Preferences for Local Councils 
 
Answer Percentage (%) Number 
Seven councils 13 150 
Eleven councils 11 126 
Fifteen councils 27 310 
No preference 43 493 
Others 6 69 
TOTAL 100 1148 
Figure 1: How many councils?
Seven Councils
13%
Eleven Councils
11%
Fifteen Councils
27%
No preference
43%
Others
6%
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Public Consultation 
In addition to the above Northern-Ireland survey, evidence was provided as a result of the 
responses to the ‘RPA: Further Consultation Document’ (March 2005) which attracted 
1,032 replies
3
. However, the majority of these responses came from lobby campaign 
groups in the education sector. The non-campaign related responses amounted to 443 
returns within the consultation. Some 113 consultees expressed a preference for a number 
or range of councils. Of these: 
 70 of the consultees expressed a preference for 7 councils (62%) 
 80 of the consultees expressed a preference for 11 councils or less (71%) 
 20 of the consultees expressed a preference for 15 councils (18%) 
 
Comparing the public consultation and survey data therefore, we can summarise the 
responses in table 2. 
Table 2: Public Consultation and Public Survey Evidence 
 
 Public Consultation Public Survey
4
 
Preference Percentage (%) Number Percentage (%) Number 
Seven councils 62 70 26 150 
Eleven councils or less 20 23 21 126 
Fifteen councils 18 20 53 310 
TOTAL 100 113 100% 586 
 
 
The data show that Lord Rooker based his decision to reduce the number of councils to 
seven on the views of 70 self-selected consultees responding to the Review’s further 
consultation document. He ‘spun’ the announcement by referring to evidence supporting 
the 7-council model from ‘almost two-thirds of respondents to the consultation who 
expressed a preference’ (in essence 70 consultees from 113). Lord Rooker failed to 
mention the survey data based on a random sample of people throughout Northern 
Ireland (data which can be extrapolated to the overall population within confidence 
                                                 
3
 The Further Consultation document secured 1032 responses but was used in a concerted campaign by the 
education sector to lobby around two specific reform issues – the future of: the Catholic Council for 
Maintained Schools (CCMS), and the youth services. Extracting the campaign-related responses (n=589) 
resulted in 443 ‘usable’ replies to the consultation. 
 
4
 These figures discount the ‘no preference’ and ‘others’ from the survey data to make it comparable with 
the public consultation data. 
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intervals) in which respondents who made their preference known overwhelmingly 
supported the 15 council option. Lord Rooker’s successor (Minister of State David 
Hanson), when challenged to explain this anomaly defended his decision by claiming that 
respondents to the consultation paper were ‘able to take a much more considered view of 
the issues’ and, by implication, the views of a randomly selected sample of the population 
of Northern Ireland should be ignored – as they were (Hanson, 2007: 10). Whilst 
attaching weight to the opinions of some consultees, the Minister, on the other hand, 
chose to reject the views of key stakeholders in the local government debate, in particular 
the political parties. We now consider the views of the key stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholder Views 
When the (then) Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Ian Pearson, launched the 
second public consultation document on public administration reforms, he said: 
 I am grateful for the positive engagement and responses to the previous 
consultation document from key stakeholders, the political parties and 
individuals, which have helped inform the debate. I have listened carefully to the 
range of views expressed, in particular in relation to the future of local 
government (Pearson, 2005: 1).  
 
There was widespread agreement amongst the local government sector (see responses 
from individual local authorities www.rpani.gov.uk) on the need for a reduction in the 
number of councils, with most favouring a 15 council option. On the same token, all but 
one of the political parties (Sinn Féin) opposed the move to 7 councils. The concerns of 
the four main parties, who favoured 15 councils, centred on changes to an elected forum 
which had remained consistently stable since 1973, and the loss of local identity. New 
councils would be too remote. There would be no sense of a local cohesive area, making 
civic leadership impossible, in areas which did not naturally perceive themselves as a 
community. The services returned to local authorities did not warrant the need for 7 
councils, they argued, as many functions could be provided on a shared basis (Weir, 
2006a: 20). The Government refused to back down on its decision to move to 7 super-
councils, provoking the following response from the President of the Northern Ireland 
Local Government Association (NILGA), the cross-party umbrella body representing the 
sector:  
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 I am totally shocked and dismayed that the Secretary of State, Peter Hain, has 
embarked on a course of action which completely undermines the opinions of the 
majority of elected representatives throughout the sector. NILGA is furious at the 
Government’s decision. It is obvious that direct rule Ministers have completely 
ignored the legitimate voice of local politicians and proceeded with their own 
agenda to impose a seven council model (NILGA Press Release 22
nd
 November 
2005a). 
 
Most important however, there is real potential for ‘balkanisation’ of Northern Ireland 
with the proposed structural reforms to councils. The Government had produced a key 
policy document entitled A Shared Future (OFMDFM, 2005: 11) aimed at moving the 
polarised Province towards a more integrated ethno-religious society described as 
‘sharing over separation’. Lord Rooker in outlining the final decisions of the Review of 
Public Administration said: 
 One of the key functions of councils will be to foster good community relations. 
The development of strong local government in Northern Ireland is a ‘lightening 
rod’ for a shared future. In future councils will ensure that good relations are 
earthed in the needs of local communities (Rooker, 2005b).   
 
In fact, the proposed amalgamation of existing councils into the seven ‘super councils’ 
will accentuate community divisions as table 3 (see map 1) illustrates.  
Table 3: A Balkanised Northern Ireland 
 
Proposed Council Areas Population Catholics Protestants 
& Others 
Cookstown,Dungannon,Fermanagh,Omagh 185,795 62% 38% 
Derry, Limavady, Magherafelt, Strabane 215,516 69% 31% 
Armagh, Banbridge, Craigavon, Newry & 
Mourne 
263,384 55% 45% 
Belfast 277,391 47% 53% 
Ballymena, Ballymoney, Coleraine, Larne, 
Moyle 
188,584 28% 72% 
Antrim, Carrickfergus, Lisburn, Newtownabbey 274,714 27% 73% 
Ards, Castlereagh, Down, North Down 279,883 25% 75% 
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MAP 1: THE 7 PROPOSED SUPER COUNCILS 
 
 
 
In effect, councils in the west of the Province will be nationalist/republican controlled 
and those in the east, Unionist dominated, with the exceptions of finely balanced Belfast 
City Council and the southern amalgam of local authorities. The proposals prompted 
(then) DUP Leader, Ian Paisley (recently retired First Minister in the new Northern 
Ireland Assembly) to comment ‘this is a clear attempt to split the Province – nationalists 
will be able to develop their United Ireland policy in the councils that they dominate’ 
(Paisley, 2005). Osborne (2007: 93), in his work on the equality agenda in Northern 
Ireland highlights the fact that such sectarian calculations can simply promote zero sum 
politics and increase tensions, but draws back from suggesting the abandonment of 
monitoring data along ethno-religious lines. 
 
There was also dissatisfaction amongst stakeholders about the marginal increase in 
powers for local government proposed under the changes. Political parties argued that a 
wide range of powers should transfer from central to local government. The Northern 
Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA, 2005b: 3), in its response to the Review 
of Public Administration, ‘strenuously opposed the reduction in the number of councils 
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without the return of a significant level of services’. What is on offer under the Review of 
Public Administration is a significant reduction in the number of councils with a marginal 
increase in powers, perhaps a reflection of the sector’s own timidity when given the 
opportunity to ‘bid’ for a much wider role in public service provision. Taking into 
account the new functions devolved to local government, little more than 10% of the 
public purse will be controlled by councils. Hardly ‘strong local government’ as the 
Government claims. 
 
All of this seemed somewhat at odds with Ministerial contentions to be working in 
partnership with key stakeholders. The Review of Public Administration Further 
Consultation document argued:  
 The central assumption of the Review of Public Administration is that the new 
model of public administration will operate within the context of a return to 
devolution. On that basis, Minister Ian Pearson has worked closely with the main 
local political parties to ensure that they are content with the model that was being 
developed (Review of Public Administration Further Consultation Document, 
2005b: 3.15, 27) 
 
Vested Interests 
One of the core principles of the Review of Public Administration was subsidiarity, 
referred to in the Better Government for Northern Ireland (2006: 5) paper as ‘delivering 
services and exercising power as close to the people as possible’. That means, according 
to the Government, ‘local councils having responsibility for the delivery of a wide range 
of services that affect the lives of people living in their areas’ (OFMDFM, 2006: 5). To 
operationalise this principle the Review Team modelled their reforms on a two-tier 
system of public administration (see figure 2). 
 
The first tier is a regional tier encompassing the Assembly, government departments, and 
regional authorities, the focus of which is policy development, setting standards and 
delivering regional services. The second tier, a sub-regional tier, encompasses 
organisations that operate within common boundaries to include councils, health bodies, 
sub-regional bodies and delivery units of regional bodies. The model assumed delivery at 
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the sub-regional tier unless economies of scale (or other factors) dictated delivery on a 
regional basis. 
Figure 2: Two-tier Model of Public Administration 
 
 
 
Feedback from the second consultation paper suggested there was widespread support for 
the two-tier model, particularly the separation in the role of central government 
departments, local service delivery, and an enhanced role for the voluntary and 
community sector.  There was also backing for the transfer of the powers to local 
government contained in the responses to the consultation document. ‘People, generally, 
wanted to see a more vibrant local government that would have a greater range of 
responsibilities and influence’ (Review of Public Administration, 2005b). These 
qualitative responses produced as evidence from the public consultation can be confirmed 
by more representative quantitative data. The 2005/06 Northern Ireland Life and Times 
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Survey (a probability sample of 1,200 adults aged 18 years or over) asked respondents to 
rank:  
 Which of the following have the most impact on people’s everyday lives: local 
councils, the civil service or the Northern Ireland Assembly? 
 
The results from the survey are set out in table 4. 
Table 4: Most Impact on People’s Lives 
 
 Impact on people’s lives No impact on people’s 
lives 
Local Councils 431 (36%) 769 (64%) 
Civil Service 367 (31%) 833 (69%) 
Northern Ireland Assembly 155 (13%) 1045 (87%) 
 
Not surprisingly, the Northern Ireland Assembly is seen as having least impact on the 
lives of people. The data from the survey were collected between October 2005 to 
January 2006 during which the Assembly had been suspended (for the 4
th
 time) since 
October 2002.  If we test the results (2 related dichotomous variables) there is a 
significant difference in people’s attitudes to these institutions (Cochran’s Q (2) = 175.6,  
p < .05). What these data confirm is that the role played by local councils in Northern 
Ireland is far beyond their limited functional responsibilities – councillors are the first 
point of contact for people having problems with public services. Moreover, the data also 
highlight the democratic deficit in the absence of a functioning Assembly (at that time) 
and the power base of civil servants under direct rule government – the civil service was 
perceived as highly influential by the public.  
 
Consistent with the regional/local subsidiary model and the empirical evidence on the 
impact of local government, NILGA strenuously opposed any reduction in the number of 
councils without the return of core public services. NILGA argued that local government 
should be of sufficient size and significance to be a partner with central government and 
provide an effective balance of power (NILGA, 2005b). As the new devolved Assembly 
commenced business (May 2007), the central-local partnership concept based on the 
principle of subsidiary is a myth. Key public services are still vested in the hands of 
powerful civil servants with a centralised public administration system across 11 
 19 
government departments, untouched by the Review of Public Administration. This 
suggests that there is no power-dependent relationship between central and local 
government in Northern Ireland (Rhodes, 1986). The contrast with devolved government 
in Scotland and Wales is striking here (Laffin, Taylor & Thomas, 2002; Bennett, Fairley 
and McAteer, 2002; McAteer & Bennett, 2005; McConnell, 2006). The Welsh Assembly 
sees local government as crucial in delivering effective public services. As Laffin (2004: 
216 & 220) puts it ‘for them (the Welsh Assembly) local government forms a vital 
implementation structure which absorbs about a third of the Assembly budget’ and the 
Welsh Assembly is ‘considerably more dependent on local government than central 
government is on English local government; and a similar argument can be advanced in 
Scotland’. Compare this to councils in Northern Ireland which deliver minor functions in 
waste collection, environmental health and leisure services accounting (at present) for 
less than 5% of public expenditure.  In this sense Northern Ireland is more like England 
which is characterised by asymmetric central-local relations in favour of the centre. 
Devolved regional government in Northern Ireland has not resulted in regional centralism 
(where powers became more centralised at Stormont), rather it has simply reinforced the 
status quo of asymmetric relations with a strong centre and locally elected ministers 
reluctant to transfer functions to councils. Here again, the contrast with other parts of the 
United Kingdom is plain. Laffin (2007) argues that devolution does not inevitably lead to 
regional centralism particularly where a power balance or symmetry exists between 
regional and local governments, as in the case of Wales and Scotland. Yet in Northern 
Ireland regional centralism pre-dates devolution and is rooted in the abuse of power by 
local government which, in part, sparked the civil rights marches and ‘troubles’ in the late 
1960s. With the emergence of devolution in 1999 and the lust for political power, largely 
denied for over 25 years, Members of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly did not 
feel inclined towards strengthening the role of local government. 
 
The degree of central government insulation from the wider UK reform process is also 
illustrated by the exclusion of the Northern Ireland civil service from capability reviews 
conducted on Westminster departments (independent assessments of how departments 
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are performing). The former Chair of the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Public Accounts 
Committee (Billy Bell) commented: 
 The Northern Ireland departments have already evaded inspection under the 
Review of Public Administration. To my mind, that was quite wrong - I never 
understood how a comprehensive review of public administration could be carried 
out in Northern Ireland which excluded civil service departments and confined 
itself only to councils and health and education boards. Many people in the 
councils and boards feel very aggrieved that they should be subject to a major 
review, facing a very uncertain job future, while the civil servants in the 
departments get off scot-free (Bell, 2005:1). 
 
There is however substantial evidence of the need for reforms to both the structure and 
effectiveness of central government departments in Northern Ireland. Parry’s work 
(2003) on the issues facing the civil service in Scotland under devolution is equally 
significant in Northern Ireland. He described four challenges facing Scottish civil 
servants: how they present themselves and relate to others; how they configure and 
operate the administrative machine; how they see themselves relating to the traditions of 
the Civil Service; and how they equip themselves to advise ministers on policy 
development. Former Minister Lord Rooker, for example, described the structure of 11 
NI departments as ‘absolutely bamy’. During his time as a direct rule minister in 
Northern Ireland with line responsibility for four departments he said, ‘let’s face it, the 
structure of 11 departments is illogical. Every week I find I am responsible for something 
new. The structure was created after the Good Friday Agreement to ensure there were 
enough ministerial portfolios to share between parties’ (Rooker, 2005c:1). Yet 
performance by civil service departments has attracted severe criticism from 
Westminster’s Public Accounts Committee. One member noted ‘I am worried that 
Northern Ireland’s citizens and taxpayers may not be receiving the service we expect to 
see in the rest of the United Kingdom. The overall message must be, in all the areas that 
we have looked at, there is enormous scope to improve’ (Bacon, 2006: 11).  
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Conclusions 
So why would (direct rule) ministers choose to ignore empirical evidence in reaching 
decisions about public administration reform in Northern Ireland? Were there wider 
political issues at stake? The position of Sinn Féin on local government reform is 
instructive.  All political parties resolutely opposed the reduction in the numbers of 
councils from 26 to 7, except Sinn Féin. The obvious question is why was Sinn Féin 
supportive of direct rule ministers on this issue? This is all the more intriguing when one 
of its senior members (Francie Molloy), who held the post of vice-president of the 
Northern Ireland Local Government Association, was suspended by Sinn Féin in 
November 2005 for contravening party policy and adopting NILGA’s position in favour 
of 15 councils. 
 
Two issues arise from the seemingly apolitical public services reform agenda. First, the 
political demography of the seven-council model may well allow Sinn Féin to gain 
control of sizeable areas west of the Province, in keeping with accusations from the DUP 
that this is an insidious threat to move the Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan and Monaghan 
borders and expand the Republic of Ireland. Second, the controversial nature of the 
public administration reform agenda was to goad the political parties into responding 
positively to a power-sharing executive and the restoration of devolution.  This was 
captured by one Minister’s informal remark ‘if you don’t like it, you know what to do’, a 
clear reference to local representatives participating in devolved government. In a debate 
in the transitional Assembly, one DUP representative voiced concerns about government 
tactics: 
 The Government has constantly blocked debate on the Review of Public 
Administration issue because the decision to support a seven-council model is one 
of the least justifiable of their many bad recent decisions. It has the least merit, is 
the most politically driven and has been produced for the wrong reasons. It is 
particularly appalling that the Government has used the issues of reform of public 
administration and the number of councils as devices in its wider schemes for 
political progress in Northern Ireland (Weir, 2006b). 
 
As a result of this debate, the transitional Assembly expressed serious disquiet about the 
potential of a 7 council model to centralise services, remove jobs and resources from 
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many areas, and to underpin sectarianism and community division; and called on the 
Secretary of State ‘to shelve present plans for super councils and allow the decision on 
future council arrangements to be taken by a restored Northern Ireland Assembly’ 
(Hansard, 5
th
 December 2006). 
 
The reforms arising from the Review of Public Administration were described as ‘a 
vision of change that represents the greatest single challenge to the public sector in 
Northern Ireland for over 30 years’ (Hain, 2005: 14). From our analysis it is clear that 
key empirical evidence in reaching decisions on the potential reform package was 
ignored. Should we be surprised by this? Young, Ashby, Boaz and Grayson (2002) 
contrast the ideal type policy process and the realities of policy making in the following 
way. In the former, ‘information is supplied which is objective, and possibly conclusive, 
reducing uncertainties about the relationship between policies and outcomes’. In the 
latter, ‘decisions are less about projected consequences and more about process and 
legitimation. Politics is about shaping interpretations and expressing preferences’ (Young 
et al, 2002: 218).  In fact, the Northern Ireland case study is a good example of Young et 
al’s ‘political/tactical’ model in which policy is an outcome of the wider political process 
(in this case, forcing local politicians to share power). Their warning (Young et al, 2002: 
217) that ‘in extreme cases the research/researcher can become vulnerable to political 
attack’ transpired. Minister Hanson, somewhat ironically, attacked the evidence presented 
by this author as being ‘selective in the information chosen’ and ‘not providing 
alternative research in support of another council model’ (Hanson, 2007:10). 
 
The Review of Public Administration accumulated a significant body of evidence to 
support the final decisions arrived at by the Secretary of State. Expecting the outcomes to 
be causally linked to the evidence is to ignore the messy realities of the decision making 
process in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Civil servants, with their monopoly on power, 
and largely unaffected by the wider UK modernising agenda which promoted the primacy 
of evidence based policy making, drove the reform agenda. A hand-picked team of 
officials conducted the review of public administration and, by design, the process 
excluded government departments. In ‘normal’ direct rule circumstances the will of 
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senior civil servants would have prevailed. But a bigger political prize was at stake. 
Direct rule ministers sought to provoke locally elected representatives and their political 
parties into agreeing to devolution by deliberately opposing their views on the reforms of 
local government. Local government reform in Northern Ireland is perhaps an unintended 
example of the kind of process referred to by Parsons (2002: 56) who, drawing on the 
work of Lasswell, argued that the aim of policy sciences is to contribute to the 
democratisation of the policy making process, in contrast to an evidence based approach 
which seeks ‘to de-politicise and managerialise knowledge production and its utilisation’.  
 
With the return to a devolved administration in Northern Ireland, local government 
reform is back on the policy agenda and the new Assembly reviewed ‘final’ decisions by 
their direct rule predecessors to set up 7 ‘super-councils’. Local Department of 
Environment Minister, Arlene Foster, launched ‘a review of the review’ in August 2007 
and subsequently overturned both the number and functions of local government agreed 
in the Review of Public Administration. The instrumental rationality synonymous with 
evidence based policy was eschewed by direct rule ministers in favour of political 
decision making and locally elected ministers followed suit. Despite hostility from the 
local government community, Minister Foster announced to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (31
st
 March 2008) that:  
 The number of councils in Northern Ireland will now be rationalised from 26 to 
11. 
 Additional functions of the new councils will include: local development plans; 
local public realm aspects of roads; urban regeneration and community 
development; housing-related functions; local economic development; and local 
tourism, arts, sports and leisure. 
 An independent Local Government Boundaries Commissioner was appointed (for 
the second time) to redraw 11 new council boundaries. 
 A local government modernisation process will be supported by the Department 
of the Environment. 
 The timeline for reorganised local government will now be elections to the new 
councils in 2011. 
 
The new functions will require a 25% increase in council budgets and 12% increase in 
council staffing. This suggests an annual (new) council expenditure of around £575m out 
of a total devolved budget of around £8 billion – just over 7% of the public purse. 
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Councils have been offered public realm roads responsibilities such as weed spraying and 
emptying gullies, hardly the stuff of ‘strong local government’ promised at the outset of 
the Review of Public Administration. Local government will remain for the foreseeable 
future a relatively minor player in the governance arrangements of Northern Ireland. The 
asymmetry of power relationships between Stormont and councils has not shifted as a 
result of devolution. Instead, there has been a marginal increase in the functions of local 
government and a Policy Development Panel, comprising councillors and local 
government officers, established to develop central-local relations under the new 11-
council arrangements. The Policy Development Panel will report to a Strategic 
Leadership Board set up to oversee the transition process until 2011 and chaired by the 
Minister of the Environment. Drawing on the Welsh model, current proposals are to 
establish a statutory Partnership Panel comprising joint membership from the Northern 
Ireland Executive and local government elected representatives. In practice, given the 
lack of power dependence between the central and local government, it is difficult to see 
this as anything other than a mechanism for communication, consultation and advice.  
 
In summary, the decisions on the reform of local government in Northern Ireland were 
always going to be politically determined. This paper sought to test the robustness of the 
Minister’s claim that they were otherwise. Devolution and the Review of Public 
Administration have not provided the opportunities to strengthen the role of local 
government in Northern Ireland. Instead, the asymmetry of power relationships between 
central and local government has been reinforced, aided and abetted by a powerful civil 
service unwilling to see their departments dismantled and functions devolved to councils. 
The political outworkings of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, in which political 
parties are keen to demonstrate their ministerial credentials, has compounded these 
centripetal tendencies. Regional centralism and limited local government best 
characterise Northern Ireland’s governance arrangements now and in the future. 
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